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This article examines the category of ‘the child’ in European human rights law, based on an analysis 
of the child-related jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. I argue that a full 
account of legal selfhood is constructed through the notion of ‘the child’ in this jurisprudence. The 
two notions – of ‘the child’ and ‘the self’ – are, from the outset, mutually dependent. Thus the 
article shows how the conceptualisation of ‘the child’ in human rights law is underpinned by an 
account of the self as originating in another and how childhood is cast as enabling self-
understanding by making possible the formation of a narrative about the self. The vision of ‘the 
self’ that emerges here is one of ‘the narrative self’, and I assess the implications of this both for 
the idea of childhood in which this narrative originates and for the vision of the human condition 
that is expressed in European human rights law more broadly. 
INTRODUCTION 
In European human rights law, the category of ‘the child’ is put to considerable work. ‘The child’ 
is at once constructed as an object of desire (the expected or hoped-for child),1 as a symbol of 
commitment and constancy in a relationship between two individuals,2 and as a distinct individual 
whose ‘best interests’ often reign as paramount.3 ‘Childhood’ itself, as a space and time occupied 
by ‘the child’, emerges as a structure through which vital knowledge is transmitted from ‘adults’ to 
‘the young’4 and as a time for ‘the fundamental programming of personality’.5 It is in the category 
of ‘the child’ that we see, in this way, the articulation and delineation of a vision of the development 
of ‘the individual’ more generally – ‘the individual’ who is then posited as the basic foundational 
principle of European human rights law, and the protection of whose freedom and dignity forms 
the central task of human rights law’s mission.6  
                                                          
* Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. I am very grateful to Damian Chalmers, 
Kai Möller, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.    
1 eg Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy ECtHR 24 Jan 2017, para.215. 
2 eg Kroon and Others v The Netherlands (1995) 19 EHRR 263, para.30; Al-Nashif v Bulgaria (2003) EHRR 37, 
para.112; Joseph Grant v UK ECtHR 8 Jan 2009, para.30.   
3 eg Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2012) 54 EHRR 31, para.135. 
4 Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 293, para.33. 
5 Maumousseau and Washington v France (2010) 51 EHRR 35, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Zupančič, joined by 
Judge Gyulumyan, para.O-I4. 
6 See eg Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18, para.90: ‘the very essence of the Convention is respect for human 
dignity and human freedom’. 
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Thus within the structure of European human rights law, the category of ‘the child’ is of 
fundamental significance; and the complexity of the condition and meaning of being a child within 
the vision of human rights law accordingly calls for further analysis. That is the contribution of 
this article; and in the pages that follow, I set out an account of the category of ‘the child’ in 
European human rights law, based on an analysis of all the child-related jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to date.7 The main argument that I put forward here 
is that a full account of legal selfhood is constructed and set out through the notion of ‘the child’ 
in European human rights law. Within the conceptualisation of ‘the child’, thus, there is not only 
an account crafted out of ‘the child’ as firmly situated in the context of its parents, and of the role 
of the ‘other’ in constructing ‘the child’, but there is also an account of the self as originating in 
another (Section A). Childhood is deemed vital in this context, insofar as two processes which are 
considered fundamental to the formation of the self – individuation and habituation – originate in 
childhood (Section B). Individuation is about the delineation of the specific child, and the 
articulation of her interests (as distinct from those of her parents), and habituation is about the 
engraining of actions and elements of being as habits, such that they become unconscious features 
of an individual’s character. Childhood, in this way, is accorded such an integral role in human 
rights law’s account of the formation of the self that it is cast as supplying the framework through 
which life is subsequently structured and interpreted (Section C). The idea underlying the case law 
here is that an account of childhood enables self-understanding, because it makes possible the 
formation of a narrative about the self. The vision of ‘the self’ that emerges from the depths of 
the category of ‘the child’ in European human rights law is, accordingly, a vision of ‘the narrative 
self’. 
A. ‘THE CHILD’ 
That ‘the child’ is constructed as a category in European human rights law comes to the fore most 
clearly in cases in which no specific child is identified and rather a very general idea of ‘the child’ 
is imagined. Such is the case, for example, in instances concerning application procedures for 
authorisation to adopt a child, in which the lack of identification of a ‘specific child’ does not rule 
out the fact of the centrality to be accorded in such cases to the ‘best interests’ of ‘children’ in 
general.8 The generality and indeterminacy of this notion leaves a lot of scope for imagining what 
these ‘best interests’ are; and that imagination, in turn, presupposes some conception of ‘children’ 
as a class and the category of ‘the child’ in the first place. This category then comes to carry a 
                                                          
7 The paper is based on an examination of all the ECtHR cases up to 1 June 2017 which feature the word ‘child’ 
(or any other associated words, such as ‘childhood’, ‘juvenile’, ‘minor’, ‘baby’, ‘parent’, or ‘pupil’). 
8 Fretté v France (2004) 38 EHRR 21, para.42; E.B. v France (2008) 47 EHRR 21, para.76. 
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normative and normalising force; and it is in this context that notions such as of the ‘normal 
development’ of the family life of the child9 and of what a ‘normal childhood’ consists in10 make 
their way into the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  
Once the category of ‘the child’ is accorded a life of its own in this way, tensions 
occasionally arise between the weight of this category – as a socio-legal construction – and the 
concrete interests of a specific child. An example is X, Y, and Z v UK (1997), in which the 
Applicants complained of the lack of legal recognition of the father-child relationship between X 
(a female-to-male transsexual) and Z (the child, who had been conceived by donor insemination 
and carried by Y, X’s partner). The Applicants alleged that this had breached their right to respect 
for their family life under Article 8 ECHR; and in particular, they argued that it might undermine 
Z’s ‘sense of security within the family’.11 The Court, however, considered that the concerns of the 
Applicants about the particular position of Z could be circumvented by, for example, making a 
will (to mitigate the effect of the intestacy laws, which would not grant Z an automatic right to 
inherit from X) and concealing the reason as to why X’s name was absent from Z’s birth certificate 
(which was that X had been born female). Instead, the Court was more occupied with the idea that 
granting the legal recognition demanded here might not necessarily be to the advantage of children 
conceived by artificial insemination in this way ‘in general’.12 In the light of this uncertainty, the 
Court preferred to protect the stability of its category of ‘the child’ – a category which, under 
Article 8, does not oblige States ‘formally to recognise as the father of a child a person who is not 
the biological father’13 – over the specific interests of Z and her family in having their relationships 
legally recognised.   
The question that arises, against the backdrop of the normativity of this category and the 
importance that is accorded in law to its stability, is of the form that is taken by ‘the child’ itself; 
and in what follows, I examine both how ‘the child’ is imagined and how, in this light, ‘the child’ 
is conceptualised as emerging and coming into being. I suggest that such is the weight that is 
accorded to the ‘other’ in the process of constructing ‘the child’ – ‘the child’ not least being always 
imagined by another before actually coming into being itself – that what emerges here is a notion 
of the self, more generally, as originating in another. 
                                                          
9 eg Marckx v Belgium (1979-80) 2 EHRR 330, para.36; Johnston and Others v Ireland (1987) 9 EHRR 203, para.74; 
M.P. and Others v Bulgaria ECtHR 15 Nov 2011, para.132. 
10 eg Orzeł v Poland ECtHR 25 March 2003, para.54. 
11 X, Y and Z v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 143, para.45. 
12 ibid, para.47. 
13 ibid, para.52. 
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Imagining ‘the child’ 
The construction of the idea of ‘the child’ in European human rights law is bound up in the notion 
of ‘the parent’, and, in particular, in the right that is recognised in the ECHR jurisprudence to 
respect for the decision whether or not to become a parent. This was articulated most fully in 
Evans v UK (2007), which concerned the competing interests of Ms Evans and her former partner, 
J., in relation to six embryos that they had had frozen together, prior to surgery on Ms Evans to 
remove her ovaries. At the time of the treatment, Ms Evans and J. each signed a form which stated 
that under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, it would be possible for either of them 
to withdraw their consent to the use of the embryos at any time prior to implantation (the ‘joint 
consent’ rules). Not long after, they broke up, and J. told the clinic that he wanted the embryos to 
be destroyed. Ms Evans objected, and ultimately argued before the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
that the domestic provisions enabling J. to withdraw his consent in this way violated her Article 8 
ECHR rights. In particular, she complained that the effect of the joint consent rules was that she 
was denied her only chance of having a genetically-related child. The conflict was between her 
decision to become a parent, and J’s decision not to. 
Ultimately, J’s right to respect for his decision not to become a genetic parent outweighed 
Ms Evans’s right, and no violation of Article 8 was found. Whilst there is, to be sure, a broader 
question to be asked as to why J’s right prevailed in this way,14 what is particularly notable for our 
purposes here – from the perspective of how ‘the child’ is envisaged – is that the Grand Chamber 
considered that the right to respect for private life ‘incorporates the right to respect for both the 
decisions to become and not to become a parent’.15 The Court, moreover, recognised Ms Evans’s 
desire to fulfil herself as a genetic parent, and tried to find a way around the fact that, with its 
decision, she would not have the chance to realise herself in this way. It tried to veil her loss by 
suggesting alternative routes to parenthood: she was thus not prevented ‘from becoming a mother 
in a social, legal, or even physical sense’;16 ‘only’ genetic parenthood was in issue. In other words, 
Ms Evans, according to human rights law, could still realise her potential as a mother, just in 
different senses. 
                                                          
14 See also Parrillo v Italy (2016) 62 EHRR 8, para.196, in which, overall, Ms Parrillo’s deceased partner similarly 
acquired something of a final say in relation to the fate of their frozen IVF embryos (which Ms Parrillo wanted 
to donate to scientific research). 
15 Evans v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 34, para.71.  
16 ibid, para.72. 
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This notion that the Court set out, of individual fulfilment as parent, and cast more recently 
in terms of ‘personal development through the role of parents’,17 runs throughout the cases in 
which the right to respect for the decision over whether or not to become a parent is perceived by 
the Court as being at stake.18 It relies on a vision of the role played by the child in the wellbeing of 
the potential parent; and ‘the child’ is constructed, in the first instance, as being an object of desire, 
imagined by the parent(s) and invested with hope and expectation.19 This comes to light most 
clearly where intended family life is at issue, which is sometimes – exceptionally20 – deemed 
sufficiently strong to fall within the net of ‘family life’ cast by Article 8 ECHR, even though the 
Court has otherwise tended to maintain that this provision ‘presupposes the existence of a family’.21 
Thus in Pini and Others v Romania (2004), for example, in which two Italian couples, who had gone 
through proceedings to adopt two Romanian children, complained that there had been a failure to 
execute the decisions of the domestic courts concerning the adoptions, in violation of their right 
to respect for their family life, the ‘family life’ limb of Article 8 was indeed deemed applicable. The 
Court considered that although ‘family life’ had not been ‘fully established’, since ‘the applicants 
have not lived with their respective adopted daughters or had sufficiently close de facto ties with 
them either before or after the adoption orders were made’, this was not the fault of the Applicants, 
who had merely followed the Romanian adoption procedure.22 The Applicants had ‘always viewed 
themselves as the girls’ parents and behaved as such towards them through the only means open 
to them, namely by sending them letters written in Romanian’;23 and this relationship, it considered, 
‘arising from a lawful and genuine adoption’, sufficed to attract the respect accorded to family life 
under Article 8.24  
Accordingly, it was the fact that the Applicants viewed themselves as the parents of the 
children that was the focus of the Court in establishing that the relationship fell within the ambit 
of Article 8. The Court, in this way, concentrated on how the children were imagined – on the 
meaning that was projected onto them by their adoptive parents, and the way in which they were 
thereby situated within a particular set of familial relationships. This process of self-imagination 
                                                          
17 Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy ECtHR 24 Jan 2017, para.163. 
18 eg Dickson v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 41, para.66; S.H. and Others v Austria ECtHR 3 Nov 2011, para.82. 
19 eg Costa and Pavan v Italy ECtHR 28 Aug 2012, on the protection under Article 8 of the desire of the Applicants 
(who were healthy carriers of cystic fibrosis) to conceive a healthy child, and to use preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis to that end (para.57).  
20 Krisztián Barnabás Tóth v Hungary ECtHR 12 Feb 2013, para.27.  
21 See Pini and Others v Romania (2005) 40 EHRR 13, para.143. The origins of this notion lie in Marckx v Belgium 
(1979-80) 2 EHRR 330, para.31.  
22 Pini and Others v Romania (2005) 40 EHRR 13, para.146. 
23 ibid, para.147. 
24 ibid, para.148. 
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and projection is presented in European human rights law as being the means through which the 
individual child is envisaged in the first instance. The child is cast as being the object of an 
individual’s imagination of his or her self as ‘parent’, meaning that the origins of the idea of the 
individual child are located in the mind of another.    
The emergence of ‘the child’ 
It is against the backdrop of this imagination that the particular ‘child’ comes into being: ‘the child’ 
who is imagined and called into being by another, and the choice of whose forename – this name 
being the means for all subsequent calling – forms a matter of the private life rights of its parents.25 
This child is located firmly in the relationship that exists (or once existed) between the parents;26 
and in fact in deportation cases, and indeed more generally, the Court takes the existence of a child 
born to a couple to be demonstrative of ‘their commitment to each other’ for purposes of 
establishing whether their relationship amounts to ‘family life’ under Article 8.27 Thus the positions 
of the child and of the parent(s) are set up to be intertwined from the outset. 
This vision, of the child and the parent as having closely connected interests, underpins 
the conception of parental rights that has been developed in the ECHR jurisprudence; and that 
notion, in turn, supports a construction of the child as being an extension of the parent. At one 
level, therefore, it is stipulated that the religious and philosophical convictions of the parents are 
to be respected, as a matter of parental right, in the course of the fulfilment of the right of the 
child to education.28 But if we dig a little deeper, we see that in that same line of cases on education, 
such is the weight that is accorded to the religious and philosophical convictions of the parents – 
and to the possible effects of a school curriculum or exemption procedure on these parents29 – 
that what effectively emerges here is a construction of the exercise of the rights of the parents 
through the child. This perspective, of the child as an extension of the parent, harks back to a 
                                                          
25 eg Guillot v France ECtHR 24 Oct 1996, para.22. Though see also Johansson v Finland (2008) 47 EHRR 14, 
para.36, in which the Court accepted the Government’s argument that the Names Act (by reference to which 
the authorities had refused to register the forename ‘Axl’ that the Applicants had chosen for their son) pursued 
an aim that was in the public interest: ‘[t]he protection of the child from an unsuitable name (such as ridiculous 
or whimsical names)’ and the interest in protecting the language (by preserving the ‘national name practice’). 
26 Thus a child born of a cohabiting or married couple will be ‘part of that “family” unit from the moment, and 
by the very fact, of its birth’: L. v The Netherlands ECtHR 1 June 2004, para.35. This goes back to Berrehab v The 
Netherlands (1989) 11 EHRR 322, para.21 (a child born to a married couple ‘is ipso jure part of that relationship’). 
27 eg Al-Nashif v Bulgaria (2003) 36 EHRR 37, para.112. This is more generally used as a criterion for establishing 
whether a relationship between a couple amounts to ‘family life’ for Article 8 purposes: Emonet and Others v 
Switzerland (2009) 49 EHRR 11, para.36. 
28 eg Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (1979-80) 1 EHRR 711, para.50. 
29 eg Folgerø and Others v Norway (2008) 46 EHRR 47; Zengin v Turkey (2008) 46 EHRR 44; Mansur Yalçın and Others 
v Turkey ECtHR 16 Sept 2014. 
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much older notion of parental authority and control; and in European human rights law, the 
exercise of this parental authority is protected under Article 8 as a matter of parental right.30  
The close identification of the child and the parent in this way, and the conceptualisation 
of the emerging child as an extension of the parent, culminates in the inclusion of matters 
pertaining very closely to the child within the ‘private life’ of a parent. An example is Znamenskaya 
v Russia (2005), in which Ms Znamenskaya complained that the refusal of the domestic courts to 
establish the paternity of her stillborn baby boy and to change his name on the register accordingly 
(from the name of her former husband to that of her late partner, Mr G.) had violated her own 
Article 8 rights. She had been living with Mr G. since 1994, and they had expected the child 
together. But there had followed a series of losses for Ms Znamenskaya: Mr G. was placed in 
detention in June 1997, the baby was lost in August 1997, and Mr G. died in custody in October 
1997.  
The ECtHR considered that the establishment of the paternity of the stillborn baby 
‘undoubtedly affected’ Ms Znamenskaya’s private life.31 This was because of the ‘strong bond’ that 
must have developed between Ms Znamenskaya and ‘the embryo whom she had almost brought 
to full term’ – a bond that was reflected in the fact that ‘she expressed the desire to give him a 
name and bury him’.32 Moreover, there were no conflicting interests at stake: nobody had contested 
that there had been a relationship between Mr Znamenskaya and Mr G., there had been no dispute 
of his paternity of the stillborn baby, and establishing paternity would not, in this instance, impose 
any maintenance obligations on anyone. The domestic courts had not invoked any ‘legitimate or 
convincing reasons for maintaining the status quo’ here, and the ECtHR considered that 
ultimately, it was not compatible with Article 8 for the State to allow the legal presumption that 
Ms Znamenskaya’s former husband was the father to ‘prevail over biological and social reality, 
without regard to both established facts and the wishes of those concerned and without actually 
benefiting anyone’.33 It consequently found that Ms Znamenskaya’s Article 8 right to respect for 
her private life had been violated. 
This presentation, of the status of the purportedly biological father as a matter of Ms 
Znamenskaya’s private life, is, on the one hand, understandable. Accurate legal recognition of the 
                                                          
30 eg, Nielsen v Denmark (1989) 11 EHRR 175, para.61. The Court here considered that the admission of Mr 
Nielsen to a psychiatric ward as a child and at the request of his mother did not constitute a deprivation of his 
liberty, as Mr Nielsen had argued; rather, it was ‘a responsible exercise by his mother of her custodial rights in 
the interests of the child’ (para.73). See also Diamante and Pelliccioni v San Marino ECtHR 27 Sept 2011, para.170. 
31 Znamenskaya v Russia (2007) 44 EHRR 15, para.27 
32 ibid, para.27. 
33 ibid, para.31. 
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paternity of her stillborn child would, evidently, have been of very deep concern to Ms 
Znamenskaya, who, having lost both her baby and her partner, sought formal recognition of the 
family unit that could have been – a sort of recognition that has elsewhere been cast as a question 
of ‘social image’.34 It is notable, in this regard, that despite its stated intention, the Court struggled 
to consider this case solely in terms of the ‘private life’ limb of Article 8, and rather invoked the 
notion of ‘family life’ time and again too.35 At the same time, the submergence of the position of 
Mr G., the purportedly biological father, within the ‘private life’ of the mother drew subtle criticism 
in the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Botoucharova, and Hajiyev. They raised the 
question of whether the State’s refusal to recognise the child’s biological father as an element of 
Ms Znamenskaya’s right to respect for her private life might not have been ‘justified by the fact 
that the most interested party – the father of the child – was not alive at the time of the request 
and, hence, was unable to protect his rights in respect of his name and his family life’.36 Such a 
consideration has on other occasions been a significant factor in swinging the balance of the 
outcome of the Court,37 but here it played no role in the reasoning of the majority. Rather, the 
focus was on establishing recognition of the family unit that did not come to pass, and on 
positioning Ms Znamenskaya within this. It was to the end of locating the origins of Ms 
Znamenskaya’s current predicament that the Court constructed the origins of the child – in terms 
of his paternity – as being a matter of the private life of his mother. 
The origins of the self 
Thus ‘the child’ comes into European human rights law in the context of ‘the parent’, being firstly 
the object of an individual’s imagination of his or her self as ‘parent’, and being secondly located 
within a parental relationship and constructed as an extension of the parent(s). It is against this 
backdrop of the weight that is accorded to ‘the parent’ in the process of constructing ‘the child’ 
                                                          
34 See Kalacheva v Russia ECtHR 7 May 2009, a case in which Ms Kalacheva complained about the failure of the 
domestic courts to establish the paternity of her daughter’s father, despite DNA tests which indicated with 99.99 
per cent accuracy who he was. In considering that the case fell within the ambit of Ms Kalacheva’s Article 8 
private life right, the Court noted that she bore the responsibility for her child, and that recognising the biological 
father would not only be important for financial and emotional reasons, but ‘may also be important from the 
point of view of the applicant’s social image...’ (para.29).  
35 Thus it noted the positive obligations that are inherent in effective respect for family life under Article 8 
(Znamenskaya v Russia (2007) 44 EHRR 15, para.28) and considered also that the approach taken by the State 
here had not complied with ‘the obligation to secure effective ‘respect’ for private and family life’ (ibid, para.31). 
36 ibid, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Botoucharova and Hajiyev, para.O-I6. 
37 eg Parrillo v Italy (2016) 62 EHRR 8. The case concerned the fate of the frozen IVF embryos of Ms Parrillo 
and her late partner. She wanted to donate them to scientific research, but the Grand Chamber, in reasoning 
that the Government had not overstepped its margin of appreciation in prohibiting this, noted that it was 
significant that it had no evidence that Ms Parrillo’s deceased partner, ‘who had the same interest in the embryos 




that the notion of the right to knowledge of origins has to be understood. This is precisely about 
the origins of the child in another, and it sets out the implications – from the perspective of the 
child – of the vision in which the child is constructed as an extension of the parent(s). 
The right to knowledge of origins has itself been derived by the Court from its 
interpretation of the Article 8 notion of ‘private life’,38 and it has been invoked most explicitly in a 
line of case law concerning ‘access to information about one’s origins and the identity of one’s 
natural parents’.39 These cases involve such instances as when an adopted child seeks to trace her 
anonymous biological mother – a situation which has arisen in particular in the context of the legal 
possibility, which exists in some countries (and most notoriously, France40), of anonymous birth. 
This enables women to give birth anonymously, and not to be recorded on the child’s birth 
certificate. In such cases, the Court conceptualises the substance of the child’s claim to knowledge 
of her origins in terms of ‘personal development’.41 The idea is not necessarily that the child’s 
personal development will be blocked in the absence of knowledge of her parentage, but it is 
certainly that this will be hindered. In Godelli v Italy (2012), for example, in which the sixty-nine 
year old Applicant, who had been born anonymously, was seeking information about her biological 
mother, the Court noted that ‘whilst it was true’ that she had ‘been able to develop her personality, 
even in the absence of certainty as to the identity of her birth mother, it must be acknowledged 
that an individual’s interest in discovering his or her parentage does not disappear with age, quite 
the reverse’.42 The fact that she had ‘shown a genuine interest in ascertaining her mother’s identity’ 
implied ‘mental and psychological suffering, even if this had not been medically attested’.43 
The identity of one’s biological parents is, in this way, presented as being a part of one’s 
individual identity, and, therefore, as being ‘of relevance to personal development’.44 Where a child 
is lacking this information, a notion of ‘truth’ is introduced, and the case is cast as concerning the 
individual interest in ‘obtaining information necessary to discover the truth concerning important 
aspects of one’s personal identity’.45 The theory underpinning European human rights law here is 
that knowledge of one’s biological origins plays an important role in one’s personal identity, such 
                                                          
38 Odièvre v France (2004) 38 EHRR 43, para.44. 
39 ibid, para.43. 
40 Anonymous birth is most established in France, where it has existed since a law of 28 June 1793 and is now 
set out in Article 326 of the Civil Code. The Italian equivalent was at issue in Godelli v Italy ECtHR 25 Sept 2012.  
41 Odièvre v France (2004) 38 EHRR 43, paras.29, 44. 
42 Godelli v Italy ECtHR 25 Sept 2012, para.56. 
43 ibid, para.56. See also Jäggi v Switzerland (2008) 47 EHRR 30, para.40. 
44 Odièvre v France (2004) 38 EHRR 43, para.29 
45 ibid, para.29 
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that the discovery of this information, in its prior absence, stabilises personal identity, and enables 
individual development.  
The same idea emerges in cases in which children are seeking to resolve the question of 
their own paternity, which are similarly presented as cases concerning questions of ‘biological 
truth’, in which the ‘personal identity’ of the Applicants is entirely at stake.46 An example is Jäggi v 
Switzerland (2006), in which Mr Jäggi, the sixty-seven year old Applicant, complained that the 
refusal of the domestic courts to allow him to have a DNA tests on the remains of A.H., his 
putative biological father (but who had always denied paternity of Mr Jäggi and had refused to 
undergo paternity tests), violated his right to respect for his private life. 
The Court here restated the importance, to one’s private life, of ‘the right to an identity, 
which includes the right to know one’s parentage’, and considered that consequently, this case 
called for ‘particularly rigorous scrutiny...when weighing up the competing interests’.47 These 
interests consisted in, on the one hand, the right of Mr Jäggi to ‘establish his paternity’, and, on 
the other hand, ‘the right of third parties to the inviolability of the deceased’s body, the right to 
respect for the dead, and the public interest in preserving legal certainty’.48 In particular though, 
A.H.’s family had not presented ‘any religious or philosophical grounds for opposing the taking of 
a DNA sample’, a measure which, the Court considered, was ‘relatively unintrusive’.49 The only 
reason that A.H.’s remains had not been moved up until now was that Mr Jäggi had renewed the 
lease on his tomb up until 2016: ‘[o]therwise, the peace enjoyed by the deceased and the 
inviolability of his mortal remains would already have been disturbed at that time’, as it would be 
in 2016.50 And so, the Court considered, ‘[t]he right to rest in peace therefore enjoys only 
temporary protection’.51 By contrast, Mr Jäggi’s interest was an ‘overriding one’, and, the Court 
concluded, his right to respect for his private life had been violated by the Swiss authorities.52 The 
sense here was that the disruption that a DNA test would impose on the deceased would be 
minimal by comparison with the lifelong disruption that Mr Jäggi had experienced to his personal 
identity.  
                                                          
46 eg Mikulić v Croatia ECtHR 7 Feb 2002, paras.55, 65-66; Jäggi v Switzerland (2008) 47 EHRR 30, paras.37-39; 
Jevremović v Serbia ECtHR 17 July 2007, paras.106, 110; Phinikaridou v Cyprus ECtHR 20 Dec 2007, para.53.  
47 Jäggi v Switzerland (2008) 47 EHRR 30, para.37. 
48 ibid, para.39. 
49 ibid, para.41. 
50 ibid, para.41. 
51 ibid, para.41. 
52 ibid, para.44. 
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Personal identity is, in this way, portrayed as being supported by the establishment, in law, 
of biological origins. As part of this vision, the subjectivity of the child is, from the outset, cast as 
being bound up in another. The dependency that this generates has been theorised more fully by 
Butler, who, through the lens of the idea of ‘passionate attachments’, describes the way in which 
‘no subject emerges without a passionate attachment to those on whom he or she is fundamentally 
dependent’.53 The child’s ‘dependency and...formation of attachment’, which is the basis of her 
subordination, is also, therefore, the condition of her persistence as ‘child’;54 ‘the child’ is, on this 
account, inevitably and permanently embedded in a structure of dependency. This renders 
problematic the assertion of the ECtHR, made in a case involving a challenge brought by an adult 
(who had been born anonymously) to the French anonymous birth system, that what was at stake 
here was not the competing interests of ‘an adult and a child’, ‘but two adults, each endowed with 
her own free will’ (the interests of the anonymous woman and those of the child she delivered 
under X).55 This statement, as will be immediately apparent, seeks to convey a sense of equality 
that is antithetical to the ECtHR’s own hierarchical vision of the issue. For that vision, as we know, 
is one which squarely locates the origins of personal identity in another, and thereby founds this 
personal identity upon an original and inescapable inequality. This means that in matters of 
biological origins, the parties are never equally positioned. 
The right to knowledge of origins in European human rights law is not only, therefore, 
about the origins of the child, as subject, in another. It is also constructed as appealing to a more 
primitive notion, which is about the origins of personal identity – the origins of the self – in 
another. The vision underpinning the jurisprudence here is that there is, moreover, some scope 
for stabilising and resolving the individual quest for personal identity – a stabilisation and 
resolution which, law here suggests, consists in the realisation of the possibility of locating one’s 
self in another. 
B. CHILDHOOD 
The category of ‘the child’ in European human rights law is, therefore, as much about the origins 
of the self in law as it is about the origins of ‘the child’. The child is conceptualised in the context 
of – and as an extension of – its parents, and what this implies from the perspective of the child 
is that the origins of the self are located in another. This construction of the child is not, however, 
the only one that is adopted in European human rights law. There is also an account to be found 
                                                          
53 J. Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 7. 
54 ibid, p8. 
55 Odièvre v France (2004) 38 EHRR 43, para.44. 
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in the case law of the individuation of the child. This consists in the delineation of the individual 
child, and the articulation of her interests, as distinct from those of her parents and others around 
her. This process of individuation sits alongside a process of habituation, which is about the 
engraining of actions and ways of being, such that they become unconscious features of one’s 
character. In the following pages, I suggest that individuation and habituation are conceived of as 
being critical developmental processes that originate in childhood and are integral to the formation 
of the self. 
Individuation  
The articulation, in European human rights law, of the individual child, as distinct from the general 
idea of ‘the child’, and as distinct also from the child’s parents and others around her, occurs 
primarily through the lens of the ‘best interests’ principle. In the way in which this is conceived of 
in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, it stipulates that in all decisions concerning children, the 
primary, or paramount, consideration is the ‘best interests’ of the child,56 of which a ‘personal 
development perspective’ is taken.57 In cases involving parent-child relations, the vision of what a 
child’s ‘best interests’ actually consist in essentially hinges on two things: ‘that the child’s ties with 
its family must be maintained, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit’, and 
that ‘it is in the child’s interest to ensure its development in a sound environment, and a parent 
cannot be entitled under Article 8 to have such measures taken as would harm the child’s health 
and development’.58 And so whilst, on the one hand, the ‘best interests’ principle appears to enable 
the interests of a specific child, in a specific case, to be delineated,59 it has also enabled the 
articulation of a much more general and normative account of child development. 
The first element of this account – the point about family ties – is a reflection of the most 
basic principle of the Article 8 ‘family life’ jurisprudence, which is that ‘[t]he mutual enjoyment by 
parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life’.60 It 
                                                          
56 See esp. Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2012) 54 EHRR 31, paras.134-135. Notably, in para.134, the Grand 
Chamber refers to the child’s best interests as ‘the primary consideration’, and then, in para.135, notes the 
consensus established as to the ‘paramount’ position of these interests. The distinction between a consideration 
of the child’s best interests as ‘primary’ and ‘paramount’ is a significant and much-debated one. See eg Baroness 
Hale’s comment in her leading judgment in the UK Supreme Court case of ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2011] 2 AC 166, 179, para.25, in the context of an analysis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence: 
‘despite the looseness with which these terms are sometimes used, ‘a primary consideration’ is not the same as 
‘the primary consideration’, still less as “the paramount consideration”’.  
57 Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2012) 54 EHRR 31, para.138. 
58 ibid, para.136. See also R and H v UK (2012) 54 EHRR 2, para.74; Mamchur v Ukraine ECtHR 16 July 2015, 
para.100. 
59 eg the interests of the child as distinct from those of her siblings: Vujica v Croatia ECtHR 8 Oct 2015, paras.99-
103. 
60 eg W. v UK (1988) 10 EHRR 29, para.59. 
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represents a development of the vision, laid out in the first part of this paper, that ‘the child’ is 
located in the context of her parents. Here, the child is articulated as having an independent interest 
in maintaining (or indeed severing) these ties, and this translates into a series of obligations, on the 
part of domestic authorities, in relation to the maintenance of the relationship between a child and 
her parents. These are both positive obligations (for instance, obligations to enable an established 
family tie with a child to be developed,61 to ensure the continuation of family life between parents 
and children in the event of parental separation,62 or ‘to rehabilitate the child and parent, where 
possible’, in public care cases63) and negative obligations (‘to refrain from measures which cause 
family ties to rupture’64). The sense is that disruption to an established parent-child relationship is 
to be kept to a necessary minimum,65 because even a temporary measure can have a long-lasting 
effect on a child, as it can indeed also on a parent.66 And so in cases in which a child has been 
taken into care, for instance, although the domestic authorities are granted a margin of appreciation 
in assessing the need for a care order in the first place (particularly if it is an emergency order67), 
any further limitations imposed on the parent-child relationship, such as to contact, will be more 
strictly scrutinised.68 This is because, particularly in cases involving young children, restrictions 
beyond the care order ‘entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young 
child are effectively curtailed’69 and that the children experience ‘alienation’ from their parents;70 
and authorities, accordingly, have to take steps to ensure that the chances of re-establishing a 
disrupted relationship are not ‘definitively compromised’.71 Where children have spent time in care, 
the authorities are obliged to ensure that the children and parents are prepared for their reunion.72 
If this first element of the account of the child’s ‘best interests’ in European human rights 
law is focused on the child’s own interest in the maintenance of the child-parent relationship, it is 
in relation to the second  element – as to the development of the child in a ‘sound environment’ 
                                                          
61 eg Keegan v Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342, para.50. 
62 eg Ciliz v The Netherlands ECtHR 11 July 2000, para.62. 
63 TP and KM v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 2, para.78. See also Hokkanen v Finland (1995) 19 EHRR 139, para.55. 
64 Ciliz v The Netherlands ECtHR 11 July 2000, para.62. 
65 This objective of ultimate reunion (for example, in public care cases) does not, however, entitle a parent ‘to 
have such measures taken as would harm the child’s health and development’: Johansen v Norway (1997) 23 EHRR 
33, para.78. 
66 eg P, C, and S v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 31; Haase v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 19, paras.101-103; EP v Italy (2001) 
31 EHRR 17, para.68. On the effect on the child of separation from biological parents, as compared with the 
effect of separation from foster parents, see Görgülü v Germany ECtHR 26 Feb 2004, paras.43-46. 
67 K and T v Finland (2003) 36 EHRR 18, para.165 et seq. 
68 Johansen v Norway (1997) 23 EHRR 33, para.64. 
69 ibid. Any ‘total severance of contact’ will be justified only in exceptional circumstances: Scozzari and Giunta v 
Italy (2002) 35 EHRR 12, para.170. 
70 Kutzner v Germany (2002) 35 EHRR 25, para.79. 
71 eg EP v Italy (2001) 31 EHRR 17, para.69. 
72 eg Olsson v Sweden (No. 2) (1994) 17 EHRR 134, para.90. 
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– that the individuation of the child emerges even more clearly. This element is not a first-order 
principle. It does not mean, for example, that the removal of a child from her parents would be 
justified on the sole ground that there exists, somewhere else, a potentially ‘more beneficial 
environment’ for her.73 A ‘good enough’ environment, to paraphrase Winnicott,74 is all that 
matters, although everything hinges, of course, on what ‘good enough’ means. Rather, what this 
element of the vision of the child’s best interests does ultimately establish is that the emotional 
interest of the child is generally conceived of as being bound in her own stability, not in the 
emotional wellbeing of her parents.75 And so if, for example, a child, over time, becomes settled 
in a ‘new’ environment, or with ‘new’ living arrangements, however temporary or contrary to a 
court order these were intended to be, it may be in her best interests – as distinct from those of 
her parent(s) – to leave her there and not to enforce any original order to the contrary.76 Thus in 
child custody cases, ‘the passage of time...can, in the end, determine what is in the best interests of 
the child’;77 and that in itself underpins a whole host of obligations that domestic authorities have 
in relation to the enforcement of orders (pertaining to contact or custody with the other parent, 
or ordering the child to be removed or returned to live with the other parent, for example78) and 
in relation to decision-making processes and the determination of issues before courts.79 
Through the lens of the ‘best interests’ principle, the child is, in this way, presented as 
being an individual actor, with distinctive interests; and the instigation of the gradual individuation 
of the child thus emerges as being one of the integral processes contained within human rights 
law’s vision of childhood. At the same time, however, and underpinning this notion of 
individuation, there lies a normative account of the nature of the child’s interests – an account in 
which a ‘secure and emotionally stable’ environment is constructed as being a defining interest.80 
                                                          
73 K and T v Finland (2003) 36 EHRR 18, para.173. See also eg Olsson v Sweden (No. 1) (1989) 11 EHRR 259, 
para.72; Saviny v Ukraine (2010) 51 EHRR 33. Notably, the question of justification here is as to the necessity of 
the interference with the right of the parents, under Article 8, to enjoy family life with their child. 
74 D. W. Winnicott, ‘Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena’ (1953) The International Journal of Psycho-
Analysis 34(2), 89-97, 94. 
75 Cf. the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Zupančič, joined by Judges Panţîru and Türmen in Nuutinen v Finland 
(2002) 34 EHRR 15, para.O-I9: ‘In custody litigation the best interests of the child are the foremost, although 
not the only, criterion of justice. Our own case-law indicates that the best emotional interests of the child are 
inextricably bound up with the emotional interests of both parents – or even those of the grandparents and other 
relatives.’  
76 eg W v UK (1988) 10 EHRR 29, para.62; Gnahoré v France (2002) 34 EHRR 38, para.60. 
77 Nuutinen v Finland (2002) 34 EHRR 15, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Zupančič, joined by Judges Panţîru and 
Türmen, para.O-I30.  
78 The ECtHR has become increasingly strict about the enforcement of orders and about the use of sanctions 
to secure such enforcement. See eg 48206/99, Maire v Portugal (2006) 43 EHRR 13, para.76. 
79 eg Glaser v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 1, para.66. 
80 Johansen v Norway (1997) 23 EHRR 33, para.80. See also eg B v UK (2006) 42 EHRR 11, para.36; Kearns v France 
(2010) 50 EHRR 33, para.80. 
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Any uncertainty or disruption that is experienced by the child in relation to her family relationships 
and her familial environment is deemed damaging and destabilising for the child’s development.81 
Indeed, such is the weight that is accorded to the child’s stability in European human rights law 
that in another line of case law, it has even served as a justification for blocking off potential 
biological fathers. There are therefore examples of paternity challenges in which the Court has 
focused on securing and preserving the stability of the child’s home environment – the ‘existing’ 
social family unit – in the face of the ‘threat’ of disruption posed by the man claiming to be the 
legal father of the child in question.82 This runs counter to the weight that is otherwise attached, 
as we earlier saw, to ‘biological truth’ and knowledge of origins in the constitution of the self; and 
the resistance to the potential biological fathers here entails their representation as replaceable men 
(the social father now being the one who is performing the role of ‘fathering’, and, therefore, being 
experienced by the other as his replacement).83 It also, however, entails a particular use of the 
‘stability’ of the child, because the resistance, which is done in the name of securing the child’s 
stability, simultaneously secures the stability of the newly-formed, or existing, nuclear family unit. 
And so we have individuation on the one hand – the articulation of the interest of the child in her 
own emotional stability – but a normative and normalising vision of childhood and child 
development on the other. 
Habituation   
The notion of the child’s individual stability has also been specified in terms of the habituation of 
the child – in terms of the importance of the environment to which a child has become habituated. 
An example is to be found in Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2010), which is one of the defining 
cases in European human rights law on the ‘best interests’ of the child in the context of 
international abduction proceedings. 
The case concerned proceedings regarding the order for return of a little boy, Noam, who 
had been wrongfully removed (within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects 
                                                          
81 Lengthy proceedings, for example, in which a child is left in uncertainty as to where she will end up living have 
a notable potential effect on ‘the child’s mental equilibrium’: Bronda v Italy (2001) 33 EHRR 4, para.62. And in 
Popov v France (2016) 63 EHRR 8, the ECtHR considered that the fact that the children were detained, along with 
their parents, in profoundly unsuitable conditions, effectively destabilised their worldview. The situation ‘created 
anxiety, psychological disturbance and degradation of the parental image in the eyes of the children’ (para.101). 
82 eg Ahrens v Germany ECtHR 22 March 2012; Kautzor v Germany ECtHR 22 March 2012; Krisztián Barnabás Tóth 
v Hungary ECtHR 12 Feb 2013. See also, concerning the adoption of newborn babies and refusing – on the 
grounds of the stability of the adoptive family – the attempt of the biological mother to re-establish contact with 
the children, I.S. v Germany ECtHR 5 June 2014. 
83 On which see further S. Trotter, ‘The ethos of replaceability in European human rights law’, in N. Segal and 




of International Child Abduction) by his mother from Israel to Switzerland. Noam and his mother 
argued that the order for Noam’s return to Israel breached their Article 8 rights; and the Grand 
Chamber agreed. In particular, it considered that Noam’s best interests would be better served by 
his staying in Switzerland than by his moving back to Israel, where there would be serious 
questions as to the capacity of his father to look after him. Noam was by now so well-settled in 
Switzerland that despite the fact that he was ‘at an age where he still [had] a certain capacity for 
adaptation’, uprooting him and returning him to Israel would likely carry ‘serious consequences 
for him’, which would outweigh any potential benefit of his return to Israel.84 The Court described 
this in terms of the ‘habitual environment’, from which it would be problematic to uproot Noam.85  
This notion of the ‘habitual environment’ of a child has its source in the Hague Convention 
itself, which deals with the wrongful retention or removal of children and has, as one of its 
objectives, ‘to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual 
residence...’86 Here, however, ‘habitual residence’ alludes to the State in which the child was living 
prior to her wrongful removal or retention,87 whereas in Neulinger and Shuruk the Court used 
‘habitual environment’ not in reference to the place (Tel Aviv) that Noam had been ordered to 
return to, but rather in reference to the environment that had since been established with his 
mother in Switzerland – the environment, in other words, that had been generated through the act 
that was ‘wrongful’ in the sense of the Hague Convention.  
In constructing its notion of ‘habitual’ in this context, the ECtHR hints at what is, 
essentially, an assessment of the degree of social, cultural, and familial ties – an assessment which 
derives from its case law on expulsion measures,88 and is comparable to the principle of integration 
most favoured by the Court of Justice of the European Union in this context (a principle which, 
in turn, derives from its jurisprudence on free movement).89 Such an analysis, whether it is cast in 
terms of ties or integration, is looking not just at whether the child has settled, but at how she has 
settled, and her contribution to this settling; and this is what underpins the subtle distinction 
between the conceptualisation of habitual environment, which entails this latter fuller assessment 
                                                          
84 Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2012) 54 EHRR 31, para.147. 
85 ibid, para.147. 
86 Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Preamble 
para.3. 
87 ibid, Articles 3 and 4. ‘Habitual residence’ and ‘habitual environment’ are synonymous in the Hague 
Convention itself. See E. Pérez-Vera, ‘Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention’ 
(HCCH Publications, 1982), paras.11, 25. Available at: https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf (last accessed 
30 May 2017). This is also how ‘habitual environment’ has mostly been used by the ECtHR (eg Maumousseau and 
Washington v France (2010) 51 EHRR 35, para.75; Carlson v Switzerland ECtHR 6 Nov 2008, para.80; K.J. v Poland 
ECtHR 1 March 2016, para.62). 
88 eg Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2012) 54 EHRR 31, para.146; Shaw v Hungary (2015) 61 EHRR 15, para.75. 
89 Case 497/10 PPU, Barbara Mercredi v Richard Chaffe [2010] ECR I-14358, para.56. 
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of ties or integration, and the second element of the best interests test, as to the development of 
the child in a ‘sound environment’. Both, however, are ultimately about establishing conditions 
conducive to the child’s development as this is envisaged in human rights law. The point being 
made is that disrupting the child’s current stability could hinder her development. 
And therein lies the real significance of this conception of ‘habitual environment’, from 
which we can derive a broader point about the developmental vision of childhood that is 
constructed in European human rights law. For this notion of habitual environment is not merely 
alluding to an environment with which one is familiar. Its articulation in terms of individual stability 
rather renders it more a matter of individual disposition, constitution90 and orientation.91 Its 
allusion is to an environment that is inhabited: the idea is of a habitual way of being.92 Gosden has 
suggested that such a form of life – which, on his account, would derive from our socialisation 
within a material setting – is to be distinguished from the realm of consciousness and meaning.93 
Whilst ‘[l]ife is an intermingling of habitual and conscious elements’,94 it is mostly habitual actions 
– unconscious actions – that link all our actions together and establish a ‘referential 
structure...which carries the main burden of our lives, giving them shape and direction’.95 Habitual 
being is, in this way, deemed to enable continuity, and this is the case whether we are looking at 
social forms, as Gosden is, or at individual continuity through time.  
The idea in human rights law that disrupting the stability – the habitual environment – of 
a child would disturb her development reflects this sense that the habitual aspect of our being is 
doing a lot of work. The existence of the habitual mode of being anchors the individual, and 
enables energy to be directed elsewhere. In the case of a child, this might immediately be, for 
example, to school life or peers (as in the case of Noam); later on, as parental authority withers, 
attention might be directed towards the role of the child as a member of society.96 The crucial idea 
is that habituation, as a process originating in childhood, is a precondition for the child’s 
development; put more generally, the point is that it frees up a space for individual development. 
It grounds the process and pursuit of self-realisation by constructing and expressing a notion of 
                                                          
90 On which see B. R. Andrews, ‘Habit’ (1903) The American Journal of Psychology 14(2), 121-149. 
91 See eg Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium (2008) 46 EHRR 23, para.51 on the dependency of a 
five year old on its parents, such that ‘when separated from its parents and left to its own devices, it will be totally 
disoriented’.  
92 This connection between habit and mode of being originates in monastic life. See G. Agamben, The Highest 
Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life (transl. A. Kotsko) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 13-16. 
93 C. Gosden, Social Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 11. 
94 ibid, 35. 
95 ibid, 16. 
96 See the later discussion of Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland ECtHR 10 Jan 2017. 
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our historical being: of ‘the past’s repetition in the present’;97 of how, psychically, we are ‘historical 
persons’.98 Thus notions of the ‘roots’ of the individual,99 the ‘degree’ of her ‘integration’,100 and 
her ‘original environment’101 come, later on, to find a place in human rights law. These are used as 
reference points that enable the individual to develop and be challenged outside the realm of her 
habitual environment whilst stabilising the otherwise fluid notion of this individual ‘development’.  
The formation of the self 
The way in which European human rights law constructs childhood is, accordingly, in 
developmental terms. Childhood is cast as being a space and time in which a stable and secure 
environment – as underlying both processes of individuation and habituation – serves to cushion 
change and development. Underpinning this construction is the idea that childhood, as a period 
in development, is a critical time for the formation of conscience and the laying down of the self. 
Children are collectively cast as vulnerable102 and impressionable,103 as bearing a ‘circumscribed 
autonomy...which gradually increases with their evolving maturity’,104 and as needing to be 
‘moulded’ in a particular way.105 The institution of the school – and in particular elementary 
education, which is ‘of primordial importance for a child’s development’106 – is deemed to serve a 
vital role in this regard.107 For the school has, as its objective, ‘the development and moulding of 
the character and mental powers of its pupils’ (to which end school discipline is deemed 
                                                          
97 C. Carlisle, On Habit (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 25. 
98 J. Mitchell, ‘The Law of the Mother: Sibling Trauma and the Brotherhood of War’ (2013) Canadian Journal of 
Psychoanalysis 21(1), 145-159, 146. 
99 eg Aune v Norway (2012) 54 EHRR 32, para.78. 
100 eg Üner v The Netherlands (2007) 45 EHRR 14, para.56 et seq. 
101 eg the notion of the ‘original criminal environment’ with which an individual in detention is to have limited 
contact: Messina v Italy (No. 2) ECtHR 28 Sept 2000, para.66; Öcalan v Turkey (No. 2) ECtHR 18 March 2014, 
para.160; Enea v Italy (2010) 51 EHRR 3, para.126. 
102 eg Handyside v UK (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, para.52, in which the Court considered that the domestic judges 
were entitled to think that The Little Red Book would have ‘pernicious effects’ on the morals of children and 
adolescents, who were ‘at a critical stage of their development’, and ‘could have interpreted’ sections of the book 
‘as an encouragement to indulge in precocious activities harmful for them or even to commit certain criminal 
offences’. See also V v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 121, para.87, in which the Court emphasised the sense of 
‘intimidation and inhibition’ that a child defendant ‘charged with a grave offence attracting high levels of media 
and public interest’ would encounter in a criminal court, and, therefore, the need to ‘conduct the hearing in such 
a way as to reduce as far as possible’ such feelings, so as to ensure the effective participation of the child in the 
proceedings.  
103 eg Dahlab v Switzerland ECtHR 15 Feb 2001, in which the Court implied that the children, being aged between 
four and eight, were ‘more easily influenced than older pupils’, meaning that it was difficult to assess the impact 
on them of their teacher wearing the Islamic headscarf.  
104 M. and M. v Croatia ECtHR 3 Sept 2015, para.171. 
105 Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 293, para.33. 
106 Timishev v Russia (2007) 44 EHRR 37, para.64. 
107 See also eg Catan and Others v Moldova and Russia (2013) 57 EHRR 4, para.144. 
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fundamental),108 and it plays an integral role in the more general education and integration of 
children: ‘the whole process whereby, in any society, adults endeavour to transmit their beliefs, 
culture and other values to the young’.109 At primary level, this involves ‘integration into and first 
experiences of society’; secondary education, meanwhile, plays ‘an ever-increasing role in 
successful personal development and in the social and professional integration of the individuals 
concerned’.110 
The emphasis here lies squarely on a notion of socialisation – on the inculcation, in ‘the 
young’, of particular modes of being that are considered to be socially valuable by the ECtHR, in 
the name of the Contracting States. This emerged markedly in Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland 
(2017). The Applicants here were practising Muslims, who argued that the requirement that their 
daughters take part in mixed swimming lessons at school was contrary to their religious 
convictions. They complained, in particular, about the authorities’ refusal to exempt the girls from 
the classes, alleging a violation of their right to freedom of religion under Article 9.111 
The ECtHR accepted the argument of the Government that the interference with the 
Applicants’ right to manifest their religion here – the refusal of the authorities to exempt the 
Applicants’ daughters from compulsory mixed swimming lessons – pursued the legitimate aims of 
protecting the rights and freedoms of others and protecting public order. Specifically, the Court 
considered that the interference pursued the objectives of ‘the integration of foreign children from 
different cultures and religions’ and of ‘protecting foreign pupils from social exclusion’.112 It 
elaborated these notions in its analysis of the necessity of the interference, in which it highlighted, 
in particular, the role of the school in the process of social integration – a role which took on an 
even greater significance when it came to ‘children of foreign origin’.113 Compulsory education, it 
considered, plays an important role in a child’s development; and the children’s interest here in 
                                                          
108 Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 293, para.33. See also Hasan and Eylem Zengin v Turkey (2008) 46 
EHRR 44, para.55, in which the Court amended this statement slightly, noting the school’s purpose of ‘the 
development and moulding of the character and mental powers of its pupils as well as their personal 
independence’. This addition of ‘personal independence’ has not appeared in any of the cases concerning 
disciplinary penalties (eg Valsamis v Greece (1997) 24 EHRR 294, para.29; Efstratiou v Greece ECtHR 18 Dec 1996, 
para.30; Dogru v France (2009) 49 EHRR 8, para.83; Ali v UK (2011) 53 EHRR 12, para.54). 
109 Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 293, para.33. 
110 Ponomaryovi v Bulgaria (2014) 59 EHRR 20, paras.56-57. See also Horváth and Kiss v Hungary (2013) 57 EHRR 
31, para.127. 
111 The complaint was made under Article 9 ECHR because Switzerland has not ratified Protocol 1 of the ECHR, 
Article 2 of which protects the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their children in 
accordance with their religious and philosophical convictions. 
112 Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland ECtHR 10 Jan 2017, para.64 (my translation, as are all subsequent 
references to this case). (And on the objective of the integration of ‘children of foreign origin’, see also Harroudj 
v France ECtHR 4 Oct 2012, para.51.)  
113 ibid, para.96. 
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receiving this full education, thereby enabling their ‘successful social integration according to local 
mores and customs’, consequently prevailed over ‘the wish of parents to have their daughters 
exempted from mixed swimming classes’.114 The domestic authorities had, consequently, not 
overstepped their margin of appreciation. 
The emphasis here was very much on a vision of the development of the child – and not 
so much on her development as an individual, but rather on her development as a public ‘member’ 
of ‘the community’ into which she was being ‘integrated’ and a conception of which was, at the 
same time, being constructed. Thus whilst physical education, including swimming lessons, was 
deemed important for a child’s health and development, the interest in this education was not 
limited to the fact of the children learning to swim and to engage in physical exercise. Rather, ‘it 
resided especially in the fact of practising this activity in common with all the other pupils, with 
no exceptions being drawn based on the children’s origin or their parents’ religious or 
philosophical convictions’.115 The value derived from the fact that the activity was being engaged 
in simultaneously, in common. It was irrelevant that swimming is a highly individualistic sport. 
What mattered was that the children were swimming simultaneously. They were ‘learning together 
and practising this activity in common’;116 they were sharing time, and engaging, consequently, in 
what was conceived of as being the construction of a form of collective life.117  
Hence also the emphasis placed by the Court on the longer term social lessons that the 
children would derive from this experience of being in common. In addressing the argument made 
by the Applicants as to the option of their daughters having private swimming lessons instead, it 
therefore not only reiterated its statement as to the value of the children swimming in common, 
but it also considered that granting an exemption from the lessons to children whose parents could 
pay for them to have private lessons would generate an inequality in relation to children whose 
parents could not afford this. In the same context, the Court recalled that the authorities had 
already offered to accommodate the Applicants, whose daughters could, for example, cover their 
bodies in the lessons by wearing burkinis. The implicit view was that it was important that children 
should learn the importance of being in common now, and that this should be impressed upon 
their sense of habitual being (a process cast in terms of their ‘social integration’), because that 
would secure the continuity of this form of life in the long run. The children here were, in this 
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way, written into a conception of collective life at the same time as this conception was normatively 
inscribed upon their own mode of habitual being. 
Childhood, within this vision, emerges as a critical social structure. It is presented as being 
an important time for the formation of the self and an important time for learning a particular set 
of rules (a process cast as ‘social integration’). On the part of the child, a margin of error is assumed 
in the course of learning these rules.118 In one of the main strands of the expulsion case law, for 
example, concerning instances in which a State is seeking to expel an individual who has committed 
criminal offences in that State, the Court will consider the age of the individual at the time of the 
offences,119 and whether the offences were, for example, merely ‘acts of juvenile delinquency’.120 
Where the individual was a minor either at the time of the expulsion or at the time of the offences, 
the Court will have regard to the ‘best interests’ principle and, as part of this, to the obligation on 
the State to ‘facilitate his or her reintegration’.121 The focus is on the potential for the individual to 
be ‘reintegrated’ into society and to change and develop122 – a line of thinking which underpins 
cases involving the sentencing and treatment of young offenders more generally, and in which the 
Court has emphasised the need to take account of ‘developments in the young offender’s 
personality and attitude as he or she grows older’ – ‘the changes that inevitably occur with 
maturation’.123 The years of childhood and young adulthood are thus cast as vitally formative of 
the self in European human rights law, both in terms of the processes of individuation and 
habituation that are laid down, and in terms of learning and socialisation.  
C. SELFHOOD 
The vision of childhood that emerges in European human rights law is also, then, a vision of 
selfhood. It is a vision in which childhood, and its emergent processes of individuation and 
habituation, in fact forms the core of the self. In this final part of the paper, I consider this process 
of self-formation in more detail. I suggest that childhood is presented here as supplying the 
framework of meaning through which life is subsequently structured. The idea that emerges from 
the case law is that understanding one’s childhood is necessary in order for self-understanding to 
develop. This, in turn, is deemed important because it enables the formation of a narrative about 
                                                          
118 eg Emre v Switzerland (No 2) (2014) 59 EHRR 11, para.74, on how the criminal activities of the Applicant in 
question were ‘errors of youth that he seems to have acknowledged’. 
119 Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47, para.72. 
120 ibid, para.81. See also eg Moustaquim v Belgium (1991) 13 EHRR 802, para.44. In terms of offences, cf eg 
Bouchelkia v France (1998) 25 EHRR 686, para.51; Kaya v Germany [2008] INLR 139, para.70; Onur v UK (2009) 49 
EHRR 38, para.55; Joseph Grant v UK ECtHR 8 Jan 2009, para.40. 
121 Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47, para.83. 
122 AA v UK [2012] INLR 1, paras.60-69. 
123 Hussain v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 1, para.53. 
22 
 
the self; and ultimately, what comes to light here is an account of the idea of ‘the self’ in European 
human rights law – an account of the ‘narrative self’. 
The meaning of childhood  
As we have already seen, childhood is presented in European human rights law as structuring the 
formation of the self. But this structuring function emerges more clearly still in cases in which the 
ECtHR is considering the significance and effect of childhood retrospectively. One of the most 
significant bodies of case law in this regard is that concerning the expulsion of ‘second generation 
immigrants’.124 These cases concern individuals who were either born in or ‘arrived in [a] host 
country at an early age’, and on whom expulsion orders were subsequently served.125 The basic 
idea underpinning the case law here is that the earlier a young individual moved to a country, the 
more serious expulsion from that country is126 (though in cases involving serious offences, and 
reflecting what is essentially conceptualised as being a lack of commitment to the ‘host’ country, 
the age of the individual at arrival is less relevant127). In C v Belgium (1996), for example, in which 
the Belgian authorities served a deportation order on Mr C., who had moved to Belgium from 
Morocco at the age of 11, the Court noted that the interference with his private life represented 
by this order ‘was not so drastic as that which may result from the expulsion of applicants who 
were born in the host country or first went there as young children’.128 The order, which had been 
imposed on Mr C. following his conviction for a number of criminal offences, was considered to 
have struck a fair balance between the interests of the State in preventing crime and those of Mr 
C. in his private life. Thus the Court emphasised that although Mr C. had ‘real links’ with Belgium, 
in that he had lived there, was mostly educated there, and worked there, he had still ‘preserved 
important links with Morocco’.129 It considered that he presumably knew the language, that it was 
in Morocco that his father had died, and that it was in Morocco also that ‘he must have...established 
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his first social and school relationships’, which later on included his relationship with a Moroccan 
woman.130 
The question in these cases is, therefore, a question of ties. Where an individual was born 
in a country, or moved to that country at a young age, and lived the ‘formative years’ of her 
childhood there, the Court supposes that significant personal, social, and cultural ties will have 
been formed and that roots will have been laid down in that country.131 The idea is that the life of 
that individual will have been lived and understood through the lens of those ties. To use a term 
discussed earlier on in this paper, the individual will have become habituated to that country, and 
her life and relationships will make sense in its context. This notion of ties to place is accorded 
such a weight in European human rights law that it is often used in expulsion or residence refusal 
cases as a reason against expelling the parent of a child to another country, or refusing his or her 
residence, particularly if it would be very difficult for the child or the other parent (if the parents 
are still together) to move and live there too.132 It has also been used, in another line of case law, 
in support of upholding a separation of a child and parent on immigration grounds. An example 
is Ahmut v The Netherlands (1996), which concerned the refusal of the authorities to grant a son 
(Souffiane) a residence permit to enable him to live in the Netherlands with his father (Salah 
Ahmut) – something which the Applicants argued had violated their Article 8 rights. The Court 
disagreed. It considered that Souffiane had spent most of his life in Morocco – ‘his country’, with 
which he had ‘strong links with the linguistic and cultural environment’.133 The separation of Salah 
from his son had been a consequence of the decision of the former to settle in the Netherlands; 
moreover, the fact that he had sent his son to boarding school in Morocco meant that he had 
‘arranged for him to be cared for in Morocco’.134 The separation, the Court implied, was entirely 
of Salah’s own making; and Article 8 does not ‘guarantee a right to choose the most suitable place 
to develop family life’.135 
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The framing of this case, in terms of a balancing between the interests of the Applicants 
and those of the State in ‘controlling immigration’,136 and in terms of the capacity of Salah to move 
to Morocco, was also a framing which attached great weight to Souffiane’s ties to Morocco. Thus, 
and in the face of what Judge Valticos, in his Dissenting Opinion conceived of as being the parental 
right of Salah ‘to have his son by him, to guide him, to supervise his education and training and to 
help him choose and begin a career and as it were to prepare the projection of his own life into 
the future by contributing to a happy and productive life for his child’ (a construction of the sort 
considered earlier: the child as extension of the parent),137 the majority placed greater emphasis on 
the way in which Souffiane had lived most of his life in Morocco. The idea was that these ties to a 
place, formed early on in his life, structured his life. 
It is in this way that childhood, and the ties of childhood, carries a vital meaning in 
European human rights law. Childhood is constructed as supplying a framework of ‘intelligibility’ 
– ‘a framework of significance’ through which life makes sense and into which everything fits.138 
It shapes the direction that the life of an individual goes on to take; and specific childhood 
experiences are cast in law as structuring subsequent life and events, and as serving as a sort of 
reference point against which these later events or modes of being are explained. These experiences 
are always, of course, also interpreted by the ECtHR against the backdrop of its normative account 
of child development, which we looked at earlier on, and in which the role of a stable childhood 
environment emerged as vital. And so, to take an example, in cases of childhood trauma European 
human rights law goes about constructing an account of the child’s experience through the lens of 
adjustment, with the question being of what a child could, in theory, adjust to.139 In some cases, 
the view is that adjustment is not a likely option. In Z and Others v UK (2001), for instance, in which 
it was found that the local authority had failed to protect the Applicant children from the severe 
abuse and neglect that they had suffered at the hands of their parents, the ECtHR considered, in 
its assessment of damages, that the children would ‘in all probability, suffer from the effects of 
their experiences for the rest of their lives’, even though ‘[their] capacity to cope with this past 
trauma’ would vary.140 Such a mode of analysis, focused on adjustment, entails the construction of 
a vision of what is likely to be traumatic for a child – a vision of ‘child-specific reactions to 
trauma’.141 Whilst this account originates in the more general vision of child development 
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constructed in European human rights law, it also becomes a predictive, normative account of 
how a life will be subsequently lived. The idea underpinning the Court’s point in Z and Others, for 
example, was that the traumatic experiences of the children here would structure, to some degree, 
their future lives and experiences. For childhood, after all, is presented as supplying the framework 
of meaning through which life is subsequently lived. 
Understanding childhood  
The vision of childhood set out in European human rights law is, therefore, one which acquires a 
quality of timelessness. ‘Childhood’ is constructed as a framework of meaning through which life 
is lived and makes sense – as an overarching and timeless ‘primordial structure’, which shapes and 
informs the remainder of an individual’s life.142 The idea is that things in a life – events, actions, 
experiences – occur against the backdrop of childhood and can be explained with reference to it; 
and it is consequently unsurprising that, in the jurisprudence, much weight is placed on the 
importance of understanding one’s childhood. 
This notion was first expressed by the ECtHR in Gaskin v UK (1989). Mr Gaskin had spent 
most of his childhood in care, following the death of his mother when he was a young baby. He 
alleged that he had been ill-treated in care, and upon reaching the age of 18 in 1977, he began 
trying to obtain access to confidential information about his care, held by the authorities, on the 
ground that learning about his past would help him to overcome his present difficulties. The 
authorities refused to grant him access to all his case records, and Mr Gaskin complained before 
the ECtHR that this breached his right to respect for his private and family life under Article 8.  
The Court considered, firstly, that the case records contained in the file about Mr Gaskin 
related sufficiently to his private and family life such that the lack of access to the file fell within 
the ambit of Article 8. It agreed with the then-Commission, which had already considered the case, 
that the file ‘no doubt contained information concerning highly personal aspects of the applicant’s 
childhood, development and history and thus could constitute his principal source of information 
about his past and formative years’.143 The question was whether the UK had breached a positive 
obligation in its handling of Mr Gaskin’s requests for access to his file.  
The ECtHR held that it had. On the one hand, it considered, there was the ‘vital interest’ 
of those in the position of Mr Gaskin ‘in receiving the information necessary to know and to 
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understand their childhood and early development’.144 On the other hand, there was the 
confidentiality of public records, which was important ‘for receiving objective and reliable 
information’, and for ensuring the protection of third parties.145 To be compatible with Article 8, 
the British system, which required the consent of the contributor before granting access to the 
records supplied by that contributor, needed to secure the protection of the individual’s interest in 
the event that the contributor ‘either is not available or improperly refuses consent’.146 This was to 
be enabled by an independent authority that had the final decision on access. The absence of such 
a procedure in this case meant that there had been a failure to secure respect for Mr Gaskin’s 
private and family life – a failure to protect his interest in understanding and knowing his 
childhood. 
The sense emerging from this case and from subsequent case law concerning the same 
issue of access to social service records about one’s childhood is that we need to be able to 
understand our childhood in order to understand our self, our individual identity.147 This 
connection between childhood and selfhood was further drawn out in Haas v The Netherlands 
(2004). At issue in that case was Mr Haas’s complaint that as a legally unrecognised ‘illegitimate’ 
child, he was unable to inherit from his purportedly biological father, P. – something which, he 
argued, violated his rights under Articles 14 and 8. He alleged that though P. and his mother had 
not lived together, and P. had not legally recognised him as his son, P. had contributed towards 
his maintenance and had bought him birthday presents, and he, in turn, as a child had called P. 
‘Daddy’. The Court, for its part, however, considered that Article 8 had no applicability in this 
case, meaning that Article 14 could not be relied on. It considered that the ‘sporadic contacts’ 
between P. and the Applicant, and the ‘alleged fatherly acts on P.’s part towards him’, did not 
constitute ‘family life’ within the meaning of the Convention.148 Moreover, Mr Haas was only 
seeking to be recognised as P.’s son in order to have a claim to inheritance against P.’s estate; his 
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intention had never been ‘to have his claim to be P.’s son accepted in order to provide him with 
the emotional security of knowing that he is part of a family, even less so to enable him to create 
ties with P.’s surviving family circle or to resolve any doubts he may have about his own personal 
identity’.149 The latter claims, the Court implied, were worthier, and would have merited greater 
attention; for whereas it is not possible to derive from Article 8 ‘a right to be recognised as the 
heir of a deceased person for inheritance purposes’,150 rights pertaining to one’s self-understanding, 
and to one’s personal identity – and, therefore, to knowledge and understanding of one’s childhood 
and background, for this purpose – do form part of Article 8.151 
The narrative self  
The idea that one’s self-understanding is dependent on an understanding of one’s childhood is a 
development of the point, earlier discussed, that European human rights law locates the origins of 
the self in another. An individual’s understanding of her childhood is presented in law as enabling 
her to embark on the process of crafting a narrative about her self; and this narrativity, in turn, is 
engaged in human rights law as the means through which the continuity of the self across time is 
established. Thus whilst the act of living itself is not an act of narration, the act of narration, as an 
act – an attribution – of meaning,152 emerges in law as a means of organising and coming to terms 
with life and its unpredictability. It is a form of ‘self-understanding’ generated through ‘narrative 
reflection’.153 The narrative form is used as a means through which to create a story about the self; 
and, to this end, it serves to cover over breaks and breaches in the temporal experience of an 
individual154 – breaks and breaches which would otherwise disrupt the very notion of the self-
continuity of this individual. The production of narrative becomes, in this way, an act of defence 
– a defence of the individual, and her self-understanding, against these breaks and disruptions.  
One of the ways in which the narrative form works in this way is by containing anxiety and 
situating it within a greater narrative. This can be seen in a line of cases involving the allegations 
of anguished relatives that they themselves have been victims of inhuman and degrading treatment 
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on account of the indifference and incompetence displayed by the authorities in the face of the 
disappearance of their family members.155 The essence of the concern of European human rights 
law in its response in these instances pertains to the continuing void of anxiety into which the 
relatives have been plunged as to the fate of their loved ones.156 Once they are out of this void – 
once the death of their relatives, for example, has been confirmed as a certainty – it is different.157 
This is because the anxiety at the core of these cases is, as it is conceived of in law, a matter of 
anxiety about fate – a matter of not knowing something that can be settled by an account of events. 
The narrative form appears, therefore, to contain anxiety. It puts it into a narrative framework and 
imposes some order on it.158 
The use of the narrative form to ‘cover over the countless breaks in which life opens up 
or breaks apart’159 – to contain disruptions and anxieties – presupposes, of course, that there is 
some certainty about the narrative that is being offered up. But this is where two problems arise 
that human rights law has to address. The first is that a choice must always be made, not only 
between multiple and conflicting narratives,160 but also as to from where to begin the narrative – 
something seemingly settled as ‘childhood’ in European human rights law. The second problem – 
which, in fact, also troubles the first – is that narrative itself is an unstable form. In the early 1980s, 
this was raised by Spence in his critique of the Freudian narrative tradition in psychoanalysis, 
whereby, he claimed, psychoanalysts had been led to become ‘searchers after meaning’, looking 
for ‘coherence and continuity’.161 He argued that there had been a failure to distinguish ‘narrative 
truth’ (with its presentation of a coherent account) and ‘historical truth’ (what actually happened). 
Thus, Spence suggested, in the dominant assumption that the freely-associating patient had 
‘privileged access to the past’, and that the story being heard by the analyst was the same one as 
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that which the analysand was telling, there lay the tempting conclusion that what was being heard 
was a piece of history, an account of the ‘way things were’.162 Spence argued that this confused 
narrative and historical truth, and represented a failure to see that ‘the past is continuously being 
reconstructed in the analytic process’.163  
If the acts of giving or hearing an account of experience intrinsically involve a working on 
its form, then not only is there, as we already know, a construction of a narrative – the conferral 
of coherence and a semblance of continuity on an account – but, in the case of European human 
rights law, there is a reconstruction of ‘childhood’ (as the beginning of narrative) itself. And so 
whilst an individual’s understanding of her childhood may well be presented in law as enabling her 
to embark on the process of forming a narrative about her self, in the very course of that process 
of narration, her childhood itself will be reimagined – a reimagination of a space and time of 
experience which affords the possibility of its idealisation.164 Her own self will also be reimagined 
too, of course, since a ‘narrative self’, such as that which is envisaged in European human rights 
law, entails its continual reconstruction. 
The implications that flow from this vision of the self are significant. For whilst, on the 
one hand, childhood and selfhood are, as we know, constructed as mutually dependent in 
European human rights law, it follows from the notion of the narrative self that they also, on the 
other hand, necessarily undermine each other. Childhood, we know, is constructed in human rights 
law as being the time and space in which crucial processes of self-formation (individuation and 
habituation) take hold; and an understanding of childhood is cast as being necessary for an 
understanding of the self. At the same time, however, that very understanding of childhood, which 
is constructed as enabling the formation of narrative, is itself paradoxically undermined by the 
exercise of that possibility. This is because the act of narration entails the reimagination of the 
original understanding of childhood – as the source of narrative – itself. Thus ‘selfhood’, in 
European human rights law, undermines its own origins; and what remains is a vision of the 
narrative self, the condition of the possibility of which consists in its continual reconstruction. 
CONCLUSION 
The work performed by the category of ‘the child’ in European human rights law is not only, 
therefore, the work of conceptualising ‘the child’, but also the work of conceptualising ‘the self’. 
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From the outset, the two notions are intertwined. In the first instance, ‘the child’ comes into 
European human rights law in the context of ‘the parent’, being firstly, and individually, the object 
of an individual’s imagination of his or her self as ‘parent’, and being secondly located within a 
parental relationship and constructed as an extension of the parent(s). Such is the weight that is 
accorded to the ‘other’ in the process of constructing ‘the child’ that the very subjectivity of the 
child is conceived of as being bound up in another – a vision which underlies the way in which the 
right to knowledge of origins is conceptualised in European human rights law as involving the 
location of personal identity in another. The origins of ‘the child’ in European human rights law 
are, therefore, as much about ‘the child’ as they are about the origins of ‘the self’. 
The way in which childhood is subsequently conceptualised involves a development of this 
original account. Childhood is conceived of in developmental terms, and as involving the 
instigation of two processes which are critical for the formation of the self. These are individuation 
and habituation. The process of individuation is about the delineation of the specific child, and 
the articulation of her individual interests, as distinct from those of her parents. The process of 
habituation is about the engraining of actions and elements of being as habits, such that they 
become unconscious features of an individual’s character. The way in which childhood, conceived 
of as involving the origins of these processes, is cast as formative of the self involves a vision of it 
as supplying a timeless framework of meaning through which life is subsequently structured and 
interpreted. The underlying idea appears to be that an account of childhood enables self-
understanding, because it enables the individual to embark on a process of crafting a narrative 
about her self. What comes to light through this vision of childhood, then, is European human 
rights law’s account of ‘the narrative self’. 
And so within the vision of European human rights law, ‘the child’ emerges as a 
fundamental category. Not only is close study of this category valuable insofar as it enables a critical 
reflection on the sorts of normative and normalising qualities that underpin legally constructed 
categories, but it also enables analysis of the vision of the human condition that underpins 
European human rights law more generally and runs throughout its jurisprudence. The category 
of ‘the child’ in European human rights law leads us to the category of ‘the self’; and law’s account 
of childhood, which is cast as involving processes critical to the formation of the self, thereby 
becomes an account of selfhood. Childhood and selfhood are, in this way, mutually dependent. 
And yet, as I have argued in this piece, this mutual dependency consists in the mutuality of the 
undermining of each by the other, such that whilst an understanding of childhood is deemed vital 
in enabling the formation of a narrative about the self, the very process of this narration entails a 
reimagination of what was once this original understanding. If this demands a vision of the 
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narrative self as a self that is continually reconstructed, herein also lies its transformative potential. 
For if a narrative self entails self-construction and self-reconstruction, then this appears to offer 
an ultimate way out of the confines of legally constructed categories – a way which originates in 
law, in the category of ‘the child’, but also offers the possibility for transcending this very category. 
 
